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ABSTRACT 
Among the different production factors, land is the one that most often limits farm development and 
one of the most studied. The connection between policy and other context variables and land markets 
is at the core of the policy debate, including the present reform of the Common Agricultural Policy. The 
proposal of the latter has been published in October 2011 and in Italy it will include the switch of the 
payment regime from an historical to a regional basis. The authors’ objective is to simulate the impact 
of the proposed policy reform on the land market, particularly on land values and propensity to 
transaction. They combine insights and data from a farm household investment model revised and 
extended in order to simulate the demand curve for land in different policy scenarios and a survey of 
farmers stated intention carried out in the province of Bologna (Italy) in 2012. Based on these results, 
the authors calibrate a mathematical programming model of land market exchanges for the province 
of Bologna and use this model form simulation. The results of the model largely corroborate the results 
from the survey and both hint at a relevant reaction of the land demand and supply to the shift from 
the historical to the regionalised payments. As effect, the regionalisation would result in increased 
rental prices and in a tendency to the re-allocation of land. 
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Farm/Household-Level Simulation 
Results of Testing Policy and 
Other Scenarios 
Davide Viaggi, Fabio Bartolini, 
Marco Puddu and Meri Raggi∗ 
Factor Markets Working Paper No. 54/June 2013 
1. Introduction and objectives 
The connection between policy and other context variables and land markets is at the core of 
the policy debate, including the present reform of the Common Agricultural Policy. In a 
previous paper (Puddu et al., 2012) a farm household investment model has been revised and 
extended in order to simulate the demand curve for land in different policy scenarios. In a 
parallel activity, a survey has been carried out in the province of Bologna (Italy) in order to 
understand the effect of the reform through stated intentions by the farmers (Raggi et al., 
2013). 
In this paper we join insights and data from these two exercises in order to simulate the 
impact of the new CAP policy instruments on the land market in the Province of Bologna. 
Attention is particularly focused on the regionalization of payments and considers both 
potential reactions by individual farms and their interaction on the market. 
From the practical side, the paper aims to contribute an estimation of the potential effects of 
the reform and prices scenarios on the land values and propensity to transaction. From the 
methodological point of view, the paper aims to explore different ways to integrate very 
detailed farm level investment model output and survey information in more simplified farm 
models suitable to provide regional insights. The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 
we look at the background literature, in section 3 we describe the main features of the new 
direct payment introduced by 2013-Cap reform proposal. In section 4 we illustrate the 
methodology, the data and the calibration strategy. In section 5 we illustrate the results. A 
discussion is provided in section 6, followed by conclusions in section 7.  
2. Background and literature 
Factor markets are a central issue in the analyses of the farm development and of the 
agricultural sector vitality. Among the different production factors, land is one of the most 
studied. Land market is an imperfect market, due to the low substitutability, the poor 
transparency and high transactions costs. It is characterized by a low number of transactions 
and a local dimension and is, also, influenced by the economic, policy and institutional 
framework. In particular, the agricultural economic literature has highlighted the effects of 
the CAP (Common Agricultural Policy) on factor markets (Floyd, 1965; Parsch et al. 1998; 
Latruffe et al., 2006; Ciaian et al. 2006; Bartolini et al., 2011) and, specifically, it has studied 
the way in which the CAP reforms have changed such effects over time. In this section, we 
briefly analyze the literature on farmland price or rental price formation, and their 
determinants, as a background to the core issue of this paper. The first works that analyze the 
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direct effect of policy on land demand and, in particular, the effect of agricultural price 
supports on the factor returns and on the personal distribution of income, is the paper by 
Floyd (1965). Many Authors, in later papers, show a close relationship between the effects of 
policy on the supply of production factors and their elasticity, as well as with their factor 
substitution possibilities (Parsch et al. 1998; Goodwin et al. 2005; Latruffe et al., 2006). 
Several works aim to estimate the effect of policy payments in terms of their capitalization 
into land value or land rental prices, and to calculate a share of capitalization depending on 
type of policy support (Ciaian et al. 2006; Dziemianowicz et al. 2008; Courleux, 2008; 
Latruffe et al. 2009). The studies mostly agree that government payments and other types of 
policy support are significant in explaining land prices and account for a large share of it. 
Studies estimate a share around 15-30%, although it could be up to 70% depending on 
specific regions and time periods (Latruffe et al., 2006). 
The literature also underlines the effect of policy change on the reallocation of productive 
factors over time (Bartolini et al., 2011). Several papers in particular analyze the effects of 
decoupling, introduced in 2003 by the Fischler reform, on the dynamics of exchange of land. 
These works identify the determinants of capitalisation of payments into land prices, 
including the distribution of payments between beneficiaries, in connection to the possibility 
of exchange of entitlements and in relation with the ratio between eligible area and number 
of entitlements own (Le Mouel, 2004; Kilian et al., 2008; Courleux et al., 2008; Zier et al., 
2010; Viaggi et al., 2010).  
Both ex-ante and ex-post analysis have some relevance in the literature. Ex-ante approaches 
are found in the evaluation of the effects of policy as a result of different scenario. Ex-post 
approaches are developed through the evaluation of policy effects after the policy is 
implemented and are based on analysis of surveys or secondary data. Most frequently, 
econometric models are used mainly for ex-post analysis, while mathematical programming 
models are used for ex-ante analysis. 
Studies focusing on the effect of different policy scenarios on the changes of land demand or 
land rented/sold are often derived or are expressed by changes in the marginal value of land.  
Mathematical programming models have been used to simulate the impact of policy reforms 
also considering changes in farm size under different price, policy, and cost scenarios (see 
Zimmerman et al., 2009 for a review of relevant models applied to structural change). This 
typology of models have also an important use to analyze competition for land allocation 
between different farms, measuring the effects of drivers of changes through the marginal 
value of land (Galko et al. 2011). Gocht et al., (2013) found that introduction of flat-rate 
payments (such as regionalised payments) determines a reduction of land use about 0.6% in 
EU-15. Authors observed also a decrease of rental prices in the old MS and small changes in 
the new MS due to the introduction of a more harmonised SPS scheme. 
Some studies aims to investigate farmers’ investment behaviour (including land), and 
evaluate the impact of different CAP scenarios, with special focus on the Single Payment 
Scheme, in order to contributing to the understanding of the relation between policy 
objectives and farmers' behaviour (Gallerani et al., 2008; Viaggi et al., 2011). 
Several papers also show the use of econometric models based on the application of statistical 
and mathematical methods to address the effects of changes in policy mechanisms or 
property rights system on the amount of land markets transactions (Parsch et al. 1998; 
Latruffe et al. 2006; Gallerani et al. 2007; Ciaian et al. 2008; Jin et al. 2011). In other cases 
the analysis rests on surveys of intentions (Bougherara and Latruffe, 2010; Bartolini and 
Viaggi 2013). 
A subject of a large branch of recent literature is the analysis of policy effects in Central and 
Eastern European Countries (CEECs). In those countries a major land reform process 
occurred during the post-communist period and the procedure for accession to the European 
Union. Transaction cost in land exchange and imperfection of the land markets, such as 
imperfect competition, can be very significant in CEECs and the combination of imperfect 
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competition and transaction costs has a strong impact on land prices (Swinnen, 1999; Ciaian 
et al., 2007).  
3. The direct payment in the post 2013 CAP reform 
3.1 Background 
The CAP follows a development characterized by an evolution from agricultural price 
support, to area payments, and to the present decoupled payments. The latest scheme, 
introduced with the 2003 reform, and active since 2005, is called Single Farm Payment 
(SFP). Farmers receiving the SFP have the flexibility to grow any crop on their eligible area 
except fruit, vegetables and table potatoes. In addition, they are obliged to keep their land in 
good agricultural and environmental condition (cross-compliance). The decoupling of 
payments, over the years has been extended to almost all agricultural sectors. The Health 
Check of the CAP (2008) has added a number of measures to assist the farmers in better 
responding to changes on the market as the introduction of the possibility of Member State to 
elaborate a national strategy on sustainable operative programs on fruit and vegetable 
market. Several measures were abolished, such as arable set-aside, others were developed, 
like milk quotas, which gradually go towards their abolition in 2015, and modulation, with 
the reduction of direct payments to farmers in order to transfer resources to the Rural 
Development share of the CAP. Today the CAP is in front of a new reform process; in fact, in 
October 2011 the official proposal of post-2013 reforms has been published. In Italy, this will 
include the switch of the payment regime from an historical to a regional basis. The new 
payment will then lose the connection with the per-hectare payment in reference three-year 
period (2000-2002) and the entitlements owned by the farmers. In addition, the farmers can 
obtain payments on all of their operated land area. 
3.2 General provisions 
In October 2011, the EU Commission published the new policy proposal for the CAP towards 
the period 2013-2020 (COM(2011)625/3). The mechanism of payment will be based on 
disentangling of the single farm payment into four different components: basic payments; 
greening component; payments to the less favoured areas and payments to young and small 
farms. The first two components are expected to be the most relevant because they cover 
almost the total of the payment that the farmers can receive. The basic payments can arrive at 
a maximum of 70% of the amount of payment assigned to the farm (regional ceiling divided 
by the number of entitlements fixed at regional level). The basic payments will be assigned to 
active farmers. An active farmer is a farmer who has an annual amount of direct payments 
greater than 5% of the total receipts they obtained from non-agricultural activities in the 
most recent fiscal year and that carry out on his land the minimum activity established by 
member states in accordance with the definition of “agricultural activity”. These limitations 
do not apply to farmers that receive less than 5000 euro of direct payment. The Member 
State shall decide not to grant direct payments to a farmer if the total amount of direct 
payments claimed or due to be granted in a given calendar year is less than 100 euro or if the 
eligible area of the farm is less than one hectare. 
Member states can assign a small part of regional payments ceiling (respectively 2% and 
10%) to young and small farms. Member states may grant a payments to farmers entitled to a 
compensation under a basic payment scheme whose holdings are fully or partly situated in 
less favoured areas. The reform, also, introduces the “capping”, that is a reduction of the 
amount of payments for farmers that receive more than 150,000 euro of direct payments.  
3.3 From historical to regionalized payments 
The regulation proposals include the provisions to switch the direct payment regime from 
historical to regional or national bases in the countries in which the historical payment is still 
in place (COM(2011)625/3, Art.18-20). Member State shall divide the national ceiling 
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between the regions and they may decide, before 1 August 2013, to apply the basic payment 
scheme at national or regional level. In Italy the most likely strategy is to adopt the direct 
payments at regional level. In this case Member State shall define the regions in accordance 
with objective and non-discriminatory criteria such as their agronomic and economic 
characteristics and their regional agricultural potential, or their institutional or 
administrative structure. The regionalized payment is a homogenous payment per hectare for 
farms in the same region and will be distributed on the basis of the farm area on which some 
agricultural activity is carried out. This measure is prompted by the desire to have a more 
uniform distribution of payments per hectare across EU farms.  
3.4 The greening component 
The greening component of the payment is assigned to farmers entitled to a payment under 
the basic payment scheme and that comply, on their eligible hectares, with some ecological 
prescriptions (COM(2011)625/3, Art.29-32). These are a) to have at least three different 
crops on their arable land where the arable land of the farm covers more than three hectares; 
b) to maintain existing permanent grassland on their holding; c) to have ecological focused 
areas (7% of the total farm area) on their agricultural area, such as land left fallow, terraces, 
landscape features, buffer strips and woodlands.  
A different regime of payments is applied to organic farmers. The proposal allows to organic 
farmers to receive without additional commitments the greening payment. Budget allocated 
for pay greening payments are obtained by the 30% of the national ceiling. Application of 
greening payments and relations between provision of environmental good in both first and 
second CAP pillar are central in the ongoing scientific debates (see for example Matthews 
2012; 2013). 
4. The model 
Cian et al., (2012) and Puddu et al., (2012) developed a theoretical analysis of the impact of 
regionalisation on land price in a two-farm setting and a simulation of farm-level demand 
curves. Puddu et al., 2012 also develop a model to simulate the effects of regionalisation 
(intended as the move from historical payment to fully regionalised) in the province of 
Bologna (Italy), adapting a farm household model developed to simulate farms’ investments 
behaviour under CAP and price scenario (see Viaggi et al., 2011).  
The general structure of the model simulates the functioning of a land market among farms 
by maximizing the total farm profit assuming the possibility of land reallocation among a 
group of farms (i=1...n): 
Max ( )∑=Π
i
iiii pxl ,,π  
s.t.: 
Ll
i
i ≤∑  
Where: Π= total profit of the area; π =profit function of farm i; l=land available in farm i; 
x=other factors affecting land profitability in farm i; p=policy parameters for farm i; L=total 
land available in the area. 
In order to operationalise the model, a better specification of the profit function is needed 
allowing to recover the above profit function from information about actual farms, local rents 
and the policy parameters in place. Initially assuming that farms decide about their land size 
through renting only, let us assume farms maximize the following objective function: 
Max ( ) iiiii rlxlfs −= ,π  
Where: s=scaling factor for farm i, f=general profit function of land, r=local land rent. 
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First order conditions (with respect to l) are: ( ) 0,' =− rxlfs iii  
i.e. ( )iii xlf
rs
,'
=  
i.e. assuming we know the normalised (marginal) profit function, actual land available (l), the 
rent r and assuming a well behaved (decreasing) demand curve, we can derive an individual 
scaling factor for each individual farm. 
This general approach can include (and interact with) policy in different ways. In the case of 
the SFP, the formulation would become: 
Max ( ) iiiiii rlSFPexlfs −+= ,π  
With 
ii Ee ≤  and ii le ≤  
Assuming the farm will activate all available entitlements, using the available land, then: 
If ii lE ≤  then the profit becomes: ( ) iiiiii rlSFPExlfs −+= ,π  with SFP independent from E 
and the marginal value calculated as before. 
If ii lE > the profit function becomes ( ) iiiiii rlSFPlxlfs −+= ,π  and the first order conditions 
of its derivative with respect to l become: 
( ) 0,' =−+ rSFPxlfs iii  
i.e. ( )iii xlf
SFPrs
,'
−=  
The formula is analogous for the basic payment in a regionalised model, in which, however, 
the SFP is substituted by a RP and there is no restriction to the connection with the land area. 
However, as modelling shows that some SFP can be capitalised in marginal land rent even 
when the entitlements are lower than the land available (Latruffe and Le Mouël, 2009), we 
can express this as a fraction c of the average SFP per ha SFP ha: 
i
i
l
ESFPSFPha =  
( )iii xlf
cSFPhars
,'
−=  
In the model we use this approach to identify the s factor. Once this is found, we can use the 
full model for simulation. 
As a consequence the effect of the post 2013 CAP reform on the land market in the area can 
be calculated as the difference between the current situation and the new situation assuming 
a redistribution of the total amount of payments in the area based on a regionalised payment, 
by comparing the following situations: 
Max ( ) iiiiii rlSFPexlfs −+= ,π  ...(ma vedi equazione nel modello coerente con 
( )iii xlf
cSFPhars
,'
−= ) (a) 
Max ( ) iiiiii rlRPexlfs −+= ,π  (b) 
Where RP is the regionalised payment. 
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Following the model developed above, and based on model developed by Deininger et al., 
(2008) and Bartolini and Viaggi (2013), when the transaction costs associated with renting-
in or renting-out are positive, the optimisation problem can be rewritten as:  
( ) ( )( )[ ] ( )( )[ ]outiioutiniiiniiiiA tcrAAItcrAAISFPexAfs −−++−−+= ,maxπ  (1)  
s.t. 0≥iA  (1a) 
where iA  is the land endowment by farm i; ( )ii xAf , , with ( ) 0' >f  and ( ) 0'' <f  
represents the general profit function of the land operated ( iA ), , and the quantity of labour (
L ) used on the farm (both household and external labour) and the optimal farmed area ( A ); 
inI , offI  are two indicators for the rent-in or the rent-out activity. These two elements can 
have a value of zero when they are not activated or a value of one when the farm household is 
rented-in or rented-out, respectively; r  is the net rental price that is assumed constant in the 
rental market; outin tctc ,  represent the transaction costs associated with the renting-in or the 
renting-out. Following Deininger et al., (2008) and Deinininger and Jin (2008) the first 
order condition (FOC) when the household rents-in ( )ii AA >∗  yields 
( ) iniii tccSFPharxAfs +−=,'  then ( )ii
in
i xAf
tccSFPhars
,'
+−= ; otherwise, when the household 
rents-out a portion of the land ( )ii AA <∗  the FOC yields ( ) outiii tcrxAfs −=,'  and then 
( )ii
out
i xAf
tccSFPhars
,'
−−= ; finally, when the household land endowment is entirely used by the 
household itself, ( )AA =∗ , the FOC yields ( ) iniiout tccSFPharxAsftccSFPhar +−<<−− ,'  
and then ( ) ( )ii
in
i
ii
out
xAf
tccSFPhars
xAf
tccSFPhar
,','
+−<<−−  
 
5. Data and calibration 
The empirical data used comes from a survey conducted in the early summer 2012 on a 
random sample of 350 farm household out of 7379 beneficiaries of Cap payments located in 
Bologna province. The questionnaire has been realized through a telephone interview which 
was focuses on farmers’ intentions about land size expansion/reduction conditional on the 
introduction of some specific measures of the post 2013-CAP reform proposal. More 
specifically they were asked to state intentions about rent-in/out more/less land and buy/sell 
more/less land assuming the introduction of the regionalized payments, the greening and the 
capping measures respect to what their would have done in baseline scenario (current CAP 
system). The sample has been proportionally stratified by altimetry location (mountain, hill, 
Bologna hill, plain) and by the amount of CAP payments received in 2011 (below and above 
the mean). The questionnaire has been divided in different sections: first, information about 
farm characteristics, labour features and market strategy have been asked, afterwards CAP 
payments and generic planned future activities were requested, then questions concerning 
expansion/reduction intentions under current CAP and under post 2013-CAP proposal have 
been performed, and finally personal and household characteristics were request. The stated 
intentions regarding changes in farmland owned or rented in response to CAP change, were 
collected only for those who stated intention to do not exit from farming activity in the next 5 
years (about 85% of the whole sample). Also information related motivations (cause) of 
leaving the sector and future intentions regard own land use were collected. The farm 
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characteristics are related to farm size, location, legal form, main farm specialization, 
typology of crops and animals breeding, intensity of livestock production, surface at agro-
environmental or ecological measure, hectares involved in photovoltaic or biogas systems. In 
the same section have been asked information on lands rent-in and rent-out, on the 
increase/decrease of land in ownership or rented in the previous years (from 2002), and on 
the presence of relatives between owners or tenants of the farm. About labour characteristic 
were asked the number of household members working full-time or part-time in the farm and 
the number of external workers full and part-time working in the farm. Market strategies are 
investigated through questions about sales channel which the farms sell the products derived 
from the main farm specialization, about presence of sales contracts, internet use to buy 
inputs or sell output of farm production. Regard CAP payments, information on amount of 
payments, number of entitlements owned and the amount of others payments received in 
2011, was collected. Moreover, was asked to quantify how the farm revenue is affected by 
those payments. About generic intentions question on adoption of new technology and on 
intention to stay in activity in the next years was asked. Also the percentage of total gross 
family income comes from farming was investigated in this section. The expansion/reduction 
intentions under current CAP has been collected for the land in property, rented out and 
rented in and for each of those the interviewed could choose between the follows categories: 
increase, no change, decrease. Stated intentions about rent-in/out more/less land and 
buy/sell more/less land assuming the introduction of the regionalized payments, the 
greening and the capping measures respect to what their would have done in baseline 
scenario, were asked. Household information’s are collected through questions concerning 
gender of family components, number of minors, of over 65 years old and number of 
unemployed. Personal characteristics have been asked related to farmer age and education 
level, the latter divided in 8 categories ranging from no title or primary school to PHD.  
Sample is composed by 63% of farms located in the plain area, 16% in hill, 10% in the hills of 
Bologna and the last 10% in the mountains. The location referred to the centre of farm and 
many farmers who lives in hills actually have part of the land in plain, this is relevant 
especially in hill of Bologna case that have 6% of farms with land in plain area. The greater 
part of surveyed farms are specialised in cereals (47% of the sample), 27% are specialised in 
mixed crops, 14% in livestock (which includes the categories livestock, mixed 
livestock/arable, milk/meat cattle farms), and 8% of fruits farms. Moreover, specialisation is 
heterogeneous among altitude: cereals, in plains and hills of Bologna and mixed crops in the 
mountains and hills. The majority of farms have is individual firm (82%), while company are 
only 14%. Rental market shows low amount of transactions: where only 5% of farms rented-
out land to other farms with an average dimension of plots rented out of 11 hectares. On the 
contrary, quite high number of farms rented-in land. They are about the 34% and the average 
land rented-in is 19 hectares per farm. The majority of farmers sell the greater part of 
products through cooperative (63%), 32% to wholesaler or retailer, and 19% direct to 
consumers. It is worth noting that only 24% of the sample know details of post-2013 CAP 
reform.  
The second part of the survey collects information about stated intention in operated land in 
next five years. Firstly questions about stated intention in the coming years are asked 
assuming current CAP maintenance (baseline). Then question was repeated assuming 
introduction of the new policy mechanisms included into the proposal of post-2013 CAP 
reform (regionalised, greening and capping). It is worth noting that in these questions 
changes with respect stated current CAP scenario are asked. Then for each of new policy 
mechanism changes with respect baseline are asked. Table 1 shows stated intention about 
land operated results. 
Under new policy scenarios farmers could state three alternative strategies. First option is to 
maintain same intention stated assuming current CAP scenario, second strategy is to increase 
land operated and, third strategy is to reduce land operated. 
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Table 1. Pattern responses 
CAP measure Direction of change Typology Farmers (#) Percentage 
Regionalization 
Expansion 
buy 36 12.04 
rent 38 12.71 
Reduction 
sell 10 3.34 
rent 23 7.69 
Greening 
Expansion 
buy 30 10.03 
rent 30 10.03 
Reduction 
sell 4 1.34 
rent 7 2.34 
Capping 
Expansion 
buy 40 13.38 
rent 29 9.7 
Reduction 
sell 11 3.68 
rent 11 3.68 
 
Compared to the current SFP mechanism, these new instruments show a similar trend in the 
three options. In fact, greater part of farmers stated to maintain the same strategy that would 
be likely to maintain under current SFP policy. Few farmers, (10%) stated intention to 
increase land operated under new policy mechanisms. Overall in all new scenarios 
(regionalization, greening and capping) intention to increase land operated is higher than 
intention to reduce land operated. 
During the survey information about stated intention about changes in land rented-in, land 
rented-out and land owned was collected. The following tables show some elaborations on 
intention of expand or reduce farm size whit the regionalization. 
Table 2. Regionalization: Comparison between expansion and reduction in rented area 
Regionalization Decrease land operated (Rent in less land and/or 
Rent out more land) 
NO YES Total 
Increase land operated 
(rent in more land and/or 
rent out less land) 
NO 243 18 261 
YES 33 5 38 
Total 276 23 299 
 
The previous table shows that the farmers with intentions to expand rented area are more 
than those who want to reduce it and the major of the sample show no intention to change.  
Table 3. Regionalization: Comparison between reduction in terms of rented area and in 
terms of land in property 
Regionalization 
Reduction owned land (Sell more land) 
NO YES Total 
Reduction operated land (Rent in less land 
and/or Rent out more land)  
NO 258 5 263 
YES 31 5 36 
Total 289 10 299 
 
From the table above its evident that there are more farmers with intention to reduce rented 
area than those which intention is to reduce the land owned. That supports the literature that 
assigns to the rental market more mobility than the sales market and hence more reactivity to 
changes in policy. Annex 1 presents descriptive statistics of farm survey. 
In order to calibrate the model illustrated in the previous section, we rely on the following 5 
assumptions: 
FARM/HOUSEHOLD-LEVEL SIMULATION RESULTS OF TESTING POLICY AND OTHER SCENARIOS | 9 
 
• The demand function can be recovered based on information about demand slope 
(function) and the amount of land available. 
• Land can only be traded within each area (mountain, hill, Bologna hill, plain). 
• The decoupled SFP is actually partially coupled due to rotations, contracts etc. 
• The regionalised payment will be uniform across the whole area and calculated based on 
the total SFP/UAA of the area (this is also, necessary in order to the different models to 
be comparable); a different hypothesis made is that the regionalised payment is uniform 
within each sub area of the whole study area (mountain, hill, Bologna hill and plain). 
• In the model we use the individual farms in the Bologna province assuming altogether 
they are representative of the dynamics of the area. 
An inspection of survey information available shows that information about the amount of 
entitlements is largely missing (only 43 out of 349 interviewed farmers reported this 
information). In the large majority of cases in which it is available, the farm UAA (largely) 
exceeds the number of entitlements. Only 2 cases report a number of entitlements higher 
than the UAA and 5 report a number of entitlements equal to that of the UAA. 
Based on the rationale of the policy instrument, it would be reasonable to assume that 
entitlements (on the historical basis) do not affect the marginal value of land for most the 
farmers in the area (see also Bartolini and Viaggi 2013). 
However, past evidence and evidence shows that there is some degree of capitalisation due to 
various reasons, including rotations etc. Based on the data from the metamodelling (Bartolini 
et al., 2011) the % of SFP value (per ha average) coupled to the marginal value of land is 58%. 
This value is also assumed in this paper for the calibration process. 
Numerically c is obtained by “metamodelling”, through interpolating the marginal data 
reported in Bartolini et al., 2011. The demand function is calculated by interpolation of the 
points generated through simulation in Puddu et al. (2012) 
Land areas and SFP per farm, are those collected in the factor markets farm survey described 
above, while information about land rental prices have been collected through expert 
interview. 
6. Results 
The results of the model are illustrated in table 4. The regionalisation of payments causes an 
increase of total income: from 5.119 million euro to 5.698, as a result of the fact that with the 
regionalised payments land allocation is not driven by entitlements and hence land is 
allocation reflects the private optimum without any policy-driven distortion. 
Table 4. Main results of the model 
 Baseline 
(Historical SFP) 
Regionalised 
payment 
Regionalised payment 
per zone 
Total gross margin (Meuro) 5.119 5.698 5.698 
Marginal land value     
mountain 200 372 251 
hill 350 509 542 
Bologna hill 350 506 404 
plain  600 744 789 
N. farms 349 160 160 
N. farm Transaction costs model    
TC=0  122 117 
TC=0.1   223 152 
TC=0.2   292 211 
TC=0.3   320 265 
TC=0.4   324 294 
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The total income does not differ among the two regionalisation options, due to the fact that 
land allocation is the same and also the total amount of payments distributed. 
There is an increase of marginal land values as revealed by the land constraints in the model 
(which could hint at an increase in land prices); this may be due to two main effects: 
• as the regionalised payment directly affects the marginal value, differently from the 
historical payments, constrained by the mechanism of entitlements; 
• there is an increase in the marginal productivity of land due to better re-allocation. 
The marginal value of land (and supposedly the income) per zone changes among the two 
regionalised options, as they imply a different re-distribution of payments across areas. In 
particular, the uniform regionalised payments would yield relevant increases of marginal 
value of land in mountain areas. 
The results also indicate a major tendency to the re-allocation of land, which concentrates in 
only 160 farms (less than half). This does not differ among the two regionalisation options, 
due to the fact that land is constrained to be re-allocated within the same zone and the 
optimal allocation does not change with changing the level of regionalised payments. 
The model with inclusion of transaction costs corroborates the same ideas, but also 
emphasise that the actual land re-allocation would depend on the actual transaction costs. 
The effect of assumptions about transaction costs is twofold. First, by affecting model 
calibration. Assuming transaction costs the differential of marginal value of land across farms 
is emphasised and this yields different results (more intense re-allocation) in the option with 
zero transaction cost (less farms remaining). Increasing transaction costs causes a reduction 
of land exchanges and hence a higher number of farms remaining. It is expected that there is 
no difference between the two regionalisation hypotheses. 
7. Discussion 
This work is affected by several limitations. A key limit of this work is the current uncertainty 
about the Cap reform (now still in phase of negotiation). This does not allow making realistic 
hypotheses about the actual details of the allocation mechanisms. 
Another set of limitations derives from the characteristics of the model, which uses a very 
simplified approach not including specific technical constraints, land uses and technologies. 
Though they are incorporated in the initial model from which the demand function is 
derived, the interplay with change in the payment system cannot be deemed to be fully 
accounted for. The results are particularly affected by the assumption about the homogeneity 
of the slope of the demand curve, due to data limitations. 
In addition, in spite of the use of transaction costs, the model cannot be deemed to fully 
incorporate obstacles to land transaction, including distance effects, life cycle of the farms, 
etc., as well as other factors affecting land values and transactions. As a result, the changes 
due to the reform and the related economic effects are certainly overestimated compared to 
reality. This is also showed explicitly considering the effect of transaction costs and by 
comparing the results of the survey with the results of modelling. On the other hand the 
results of the model may indicate the tendency of adaptation over time in case a 
regionalisation reform is approved in the area. 
Several other limitations apply, in relation of the specificity of the area. The Province of 
Bologna is rather heterogeneous, which may increase reactivity to changes in policy and over-
emphasise the tendency through adaptation through land exchanges. Due to such 
heterogeneity, also the way the calculation of the new regionalised payment would be 
performed is unclear and hence its comparison with other areas may require a re-thing of the 
potential differences in the regionalisation rationale. 
For the same reasons, it is difficult to compare these results with those of other studies. 
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Altogether the results of the model corroborate and are consistent with the results from the 
survey. In particular, both hint at the fact that there are farms interested in selling/buying 
land in opposite directions in the area in case of regionalisation. However, the high level of no 
changes in the survey, which is normal when comparing modelling results with actual 
intentions, reveal that any change would occur at least much more gradually than indicated 
by the model. 
8. Conclusion 
Modelling and survey information show a reaction of the land demand to the shift from the 
historical to the regionalised payments. Results are supported by previous literature findings 
on implementation of regionalised payments (see for example Kilian et al., 2012). The 
regionalized payment seems to be more capitalized into the land value, at the margin, as long 
as it is less connected to entitlement. As a result, the regionalisation would result in increase 
rental prices. From an economic point of view, overall agricultural income would benefit 
from regionalisation due to a more efficient allocation of land.  
The reaction is strongly influenced by the previous historical system of distribution of 
payments. In fact, the quantity of entitlements owned before the reform and the link of these 
with the farm area is the key factor in affecting the change in land demand due to the 
upcoming reform and how each farm would interact with the market. The difference in 
historical payment and the hypotheses about how the regionalised payment will be calculated 
also affect strongly the outcome of the modelling exercise. 
A straightforward development of this work is hence to be found in the revision of the model 
once the reform is approved and the implementation process better clarified. In addition new 
instruments could be included in the analysis and/or better developed, such as the greening 
or the capping. 
On the other hand, the model can be better specified in the direction of accounting for a 
wider range of farm features, such as financial constraints, interest rates, salaries and land 
markets, which are largely unexplored in the present paper. It could also be extended to an 
actual territorial model rather than just a model of land trade within the sample considered. 
Another line of investigation rests in the use of a dynamic model, which could better account 
for the process of adaptation. 
Finally, a more realistic specification of spatial interactions, allowing for distance and 
neighbouring effects. 
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Annex 1. Statistics Descriptive of farm survey 
 
Category Variable (code) Variable (description) Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
d_hillBo 1 if farm located in Bologna area 350 0.102857 0.304207 0 1
d_hill 1 if farm located in hill area 350 0.16 0.367131 0 1
d_mountain 1 if farm located in mountain area 350 0.102857 0.304207 0 1
d_plain 1 if farm located in plain area 350 0.634286 0.482319 0 1
d_disadv 1 if the farm is in a disadvantaged area 350 0.331429 0.471401 0 1
d_rentOut 1 if the farmer have land rent out 348 0.051724 0.221788 0 1
d_rentIn 1 if the farmer have land rent in 349 0.335244 0.472753 0 1
d_saleCon 1 if have contracts to sell products 348 0.33046 0.471056 0 1
d_livestock 1 if carries out livestock farming activities 349 0.106017 0.308302 0 1
d_fruits 1 if main specialization is fruits 349 0.083095 0.276421 0 1
d_mixedcrop 1 if main specialization is mixedcrop 349 0.272206 0.445735 0 1
d_cereals 1 if main specialization is cereals 349 0.469914 0.499811 0 1
HectLanProp Farm total area in property 349 29.73066 107.5369 0 1870
d_AATs 1 if is a small farm (AAT <=10 hectares) 349 0.492837 0.500667 0 1
d_AATms 1 if is a medium small farm (AAT >10 <=50 hectares) 349 0.383954 0.487045 0 1
d_AATml 1 if is a medium large farm (AAT >50 <=100 hectares) 349 0.083095 0.276421 0 1
d_AATl 1 if is a large farm (AAT >100 hectares) 349 0.040115 0.19651 0 1
d_ExPartT 1 if have external worker part time 349 0.091691 0.289003 0 1
d_ExFullT 1 if have external worker full time 349 0.057307 0.232761 0 1
d_HPartT 1 if have Household worker part time 349 0.183381 0.387534 0 1
d_HFullt 1 if haveHousehold worker full time 350 0.871429 0.335204 0 1
d_Unemployed 1 if presence of unemployed in the household 346 0.054913 0.228141 0 1
d_Over65 1 if presence of over 65 on household 350 0.537143 0.499332 0 1
d_higheduc farmer with high school, degree or PHD title 350 0.294286 0.456373 0 1
d_LowEduc farmer with no title, primary or middle school title 350 0.705714 0.456373 0 1
Age Age of respondent 347 63.29683 13.96263 25 92
d_livOnFarm 1 if live on farm (alone or with family or only the family) 347 0.85879 0.348741 0 1
d_Exit 1 if farmer intend to leave farm activity  350 0.145714 0.353325 0 1
d_Sellpro 1 if sell products to processing firms 350 0.071429 0.257908 0 1
d_selldea 1 if sell products to wholesale dealer 348 0.321839 0.467854 0 1
d_sellcoo 1 if sell products to cooperative  347 0.636888 0.481591 0 1
d_sellcon 1 if sell products to consumers 347 0.198847 0.399709 0 1
d_sellotfa 1 if sell products to another farm  347 0.083574 0.277147 0 1
importSFP Amount of Single Farm Payment received 257 7539.428 26404.53 36 350000
ImpOthPaym Amount of other CAP payments received 25 27418.4 66675.45 200 310000
NEntitlem2011 Number of entitlements owned 44 55.29545 188.2768 1 1200
ImpPayOnRevenue Average influence of CAP payments on revenue 253 2.217391 1.437927 1 6
Geographical characteristics
Farm characteristics
Household characteristics
Farmer characteristics
CAP payments
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